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GLOBAL CIVIL PROCEDURE TRENDS IN 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
Scott Dodson* 
James M. Klebba** 
Abstract: Recent scholarship in comparative civil procedure has identified 
“American exceptionalism” as a way to describe practices which set the 
United States apart from most of the world, particularly the civil law world. 
This Article focuses on two areas of “exceptionalism”: pleading standards 
and the role of judges. Specifically, pleading requirements are considerably 
less strict in the United States compared to other countries. Additionally, 
U.S. judges are less active in conducting litigation than their counterparts 
elsewhere, especially judges in the civil law tradition. This Article traces 
some modern trends toward convergence between the United States and 
the rest of the world. With regard to pleading standards, two recent Su-
preme Court cases, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, have moved 
U.S. pleading standards closer to the rest of the world. With regard to judi-
cial roles, convergence has been bilateral, with U.S. judges becoming more 
“managerial” and European judges becoming less so. Additionally, civil law 
judges have begun to enjoy broader discretion, increasing their prestige 
and visibility in a manner similar to the U.S. judge. The final focus of the 
Article is whether these recent trends represent opportunities for im-
provement or an unwelcome disruption for the U.S. procedural system. 
Introduction 
 In a number of areas, civil procedure practices in the United States 
differ significantly from the rest of the world, particularly the civil law 
world. Notable differences include the use of civil juries,1 the preva-
lence of partisan experts paid for directly by the litigants,2 the existence 
and extent of party-controlled pre-trial discovery,3 standards for second 
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1 See Oscar G. Chase, American “Exceptionalism” and Comparative Procedure, 50 Am. J. Comp. 
L. 277, 288--92 (2002). 
2 See id. at 300--01. 
3 See id. at 292--96. 
1 
2 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 34:1 
instance (or appellate) review,4 notions of finality in litigation (res judi-
cata),5 the use of class actions and other forms of aggregate litigation,6 
pleading requirements,7 and the role and status of the judge.8 To-
gether, these individual attributes have given rise to a holistic assess-
ment that U.S. civil procedure is highly exceptionalist when compared 
to the civil law systems in the rest of the world.9 
 This Article does not quarrel with that general assessment. Never-
theless, we are convinced that “American exceptionalism” is diminish-
ing in some, if not most, areas of civil procedure. To be sure, the Unit-
ed States is still exceptionalist. But we see trends in both U.S. procedure 
norms and foreign norms that suggest convergence. 
 Convergence is not an unabashed good. There are both promises 
and perils of convergence. This Article does not take a position on 
whether convergence ought to happen. But this Article does stress that 
if convergence is occurring, it is important to be aware of what rewards 
it may hold and of what pitfalls to avoid. 
 This Article tackles these topics through the lens of two areas of 
traditional “American exceptionalism”: pleading standards and the role 
of the judge.10 In both areas, some convergence between the United 
States and foreign systems has occurred. With respect to pleading, 
whatever movement has occurred has only been in one direction, with 
the United States making a unilateral move toward stricter pleading 
requirements.11 With respect to the role of judges, there is movement 
in both directions, though there are still significant differences between 
civil law countries.12 Nevertheless, at least some U.S. judges are becom-
ing more involved in the management of civil litigation, and some civil 
law countries have ceded more control over litigation to the opposing 
attorneys.13 
                                                                                                                      
4 See Richard L. Marcus, Putting American Procedural Exceptionalism into a Globalized Con-
text, 53 Am. J. Comp. L. 709, 712, 717, 720 ( 2005). 
5 See Linda S. Mullenix, Lessons from Abroad: Complexity and Convergence, 46 Vill. L. Rev. 
1, 9 (2001). 
6 See Marcus, supra note 4, at 735--37. 
7 See id. at 718--19. 
8 See id. at 723--24. 
9 See id. at 710. 
10 See generally Chase, supra note 1 (discussing American “procedural exceptionalism” 
and how it is informed by U.S. culture); Marcus, supra note 4 (exploring American excep-
tionalism as it relates to pleading standards and the role of the judge). 
11 See Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 Va. L. 
Rev. In Brief 135, 138 (2007). 
12 See Marcus, supra note 4, at 723–24. 
13 See Chase, supra note 1, at 292–96, 298. 
2011] Global Civil Procedure Trends in the 21st Century 3 
 Further, the European Union (EU) is beginning to recognize the 
broad discretion that civil law judges are exercising in reality.14 This 
recognition seems to be a factor increasing the prestige and public rec-
ognition of the civil law judge, making him or her more similar to a 
common law judge.15 
 What promises and perils might these convergences hold? The 
promises, we think, are many. The recognition of convergence and the 
resulting comparative inquiry can enrich and enlighten the debate 
about the trends: where they are going and why, and what possibilities 
they may hold. The convergences may provide opportunities for mean-
ingful reform. Moreover, they may provide the opportunity for more 
inclusive participation in the development of global procedural norms. 
 There are corresponding perils as well. As such, this Article rec-
ommends studying these convergences and their likely benefit while 
remaining watchful of the possible adverse impact on other features of 
civil procedure, as well as system stability and workability as a whole. 
 A final note is in order. Naturally, our points are generalized. As a 
result, this Article strives for breadth rather than depth. In making 
these generalizations, we do not mean to give the impression that indi-
vidual countries’ procedural rules are not different—they are. Rather, 
we mean to focus on the broader similarities and convergences. And we 
do believe they exist and have important implications. 
I. Pleadings 
 This Part discusses U.S. federal pleading standards in a global con-
text, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s 2009 pleadings deci-
sion of Ashcroft v. Iqbal.16 This Part begins with an overview of the state 
of the law on federal pleading in the United States and then compares 
it to pleading standards in other countries. 
A. U.S. Federal Civil Pleading 
 In the past, federal pleading under Rule 8 was simple: provide no-
tice of your claim and, as long as you did not plead a critical defect— 
such as the expiration of the statute of limitations—or ask for relief un-
der a nonexistent statute, you would survive a motion to dismiss under 
Rule 12(b)(6).17 
                                                                                                                      
14 See infra text accompanying notes 116--129. 
15 See infra text accompanying notes 116--129. 
16 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950–52 (2009). 
17 See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46–47 (1957). 
4 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 34:1 
 That was a stark change from the Code pleading system that Rule 8 
replaced. The Code required the complaint to contain “[a] statement 
of the facts constituting the cause of action.”18 In addition, the Code 
differentiated between conclusions of law, evidentiary facts, and ulti-
mate facts, where pleading required ultimate facts.19 As the principal 
draftsman of Rule 8 forcefully argued, those distinctions were fuzzy at 
best and served the primary purpose of providing courts broad leeway 
to dismiss a complaint.20 
 Rule 8 eliminated these distinctions.21 Rule 8 does not require any 
kind of statement of facts. It requires only a “short and plain statement 
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”22 Thus, Rule 
8 reduces the importance of pleading as a courthouse gate and puts the 
weeding burden on discovery and summary judgment. The primary 
goal of Rule 8 shifted from isolation of issues, factual development, and 
merits determination, to simply notice. In this way, Rule 8 moved away 
from fact pleading and instituted something much closer to notice 
pleading.23 
 Of course, it would be difficult to provide proper notice without 
any facts at all. But any necessary facts under Rule 8 are those needed 
to provide notice of a claim as opposed to those needed to support the 
claim on its merits.24 The upshot of Rule 8 is that notice—not factual 
support—is the focal point. 
 The Supreme Court confirmed this change in its 1957 decision in 
Conley v. Gibson. The Court held that Rule 8 does not require a claimant 
to set out in detail the facts upon which a claim is based.25 Instead, Rule 
8 only requires simplified “notice pleading,” which means providing 
“fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which 
it rests.”26 
                                                                                                                      
18 1848 N.Y. Laws 521, ch. 379 § 120(2). 
19 See Charles E. Clark, Handbook of the Law of Code Pleading 225–26 (2d ed. 
1947). 
20 See Charles E. Clark, History, Systems and Functions of Pleading, 11 Va. L. Rev. 517, 534 
(1925). 
21 See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 433, 439 (1986). 
22 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 
23 See Scott Dodson, Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
443, 463 (2010). 
24 See Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 Fed. Rules Decisions 456, 458, 460–61 
(1943). 
25 Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. 
26 Id. at 47–48. 
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 Congress, of course, is free to modify general pleading standards, 
and, beginning in 1995, it did so in two isolated areas. The Private Se-
curities Litigation Reform Act of 199527 imposes heightened pleading 
for certain securities-related claims.28 The Act requires pleading with 
particularity for claims based on misleading statements or omission,29 
and imposes heightened pleading for claims containing an element of 
scienter.30 Shortly thereafter, Congress passed a similarly heightened 
pleading requirement in the Y2K Act.31 The Y2K Act set forth several 
requirements: first, a claim must set out “a statement of the facts giving 
rise to a strong inference” of scienter;32 second, the complaint must be 
accompanied by “a statement of specific information” regarding “the 
nature and amount of each element of damages and the factual basis 
for the damages calculation”;33 and third, the claimant must disclose 
“the manifestations of the material defects and the facts supporting a 
conclusion that the defects are material.”34 These congressional ex-
periments broke from the usual Conley notice pleading mold under 
Rule 8 and replaced it, in these limited instances, with fact pleading.35 
 Despite these relatively unique and isolated congressional experi-
ments with heightened pleading, Conley remained the paradigmatic 
pleadings case in all civil procedure books for fifty years, until the 
Court’s 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.36 Twombly ex-
pressly jettisoned much of Conley.37 Notice, according to Twombly, is not 
the critical component of pleading.38 Instead, “plausibility” is key.39 Af-
ter Twombly, a complaint fails to satisfy Rule 8 if the complaint does not 
allege facts that show a “plausible” entitlement to relief.40 
                                                                                                                      
27 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
28 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2006). 
29 Id. (“[T]he complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, 
the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the 
statement or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with 
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.”). 
30 Id. § 78u-4(b)(2) (“[T]he complaint shall . . . state with particularity the facts giving 
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”). 
31 15 U.S.C. §§ 6601–6617 (2006). 
32 Id. § 6607(d). 
33 Id. § 6607(b). 
34 Id. § 6607(c). 
35 See id. § 6607(b)–(d); Conley, 355 U.S. at 47–48. 
36 550 U.S. 544, 549 (2007). 
37 See Dodson, supra note 11, at 135. 
38 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. 
39 See id. 
40 Id. at 556–57. 
6 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 34:1 
 In practice, the plausibility standard forces plaintiffs to plead a lev-
el of factual detail that not only provides clearer notice—as Rule 9’s 
particularity requirement also might—but also demonstrates an in-
creased likelihood of success on the merits. 
 During the 2009--2010 term, the Supreme Court added another 
bombshell twist. Ashcroft v. Iqbal held that a detainee’s constitutional 
discrimination claims did not meet the Twombly plausibility standard.41 
By doing so, Iqbal confirmed that Twombly’s plausibility standard is 
meaningful and transubstantive.42 But it also added a new wrinkle. The 
Court declined to consider certain factual allegations in the complaint 
that the Court characterized as “conclusory.”43 For example, Iqbal al-
leged that the defendants “knew of, condoned, and willfully and mali-
ciously agreed to subject him to harsh confinement . . . solely on ac-
count of his religion, race, and national origin.”44 He also alleged that 
Ashcroft was the “principal architect” and that Mueller was “instrumen-
tal” in adopting and executing this policy.45 The Court discarded these 
allegations as conclusory.46 
 Therefore, Iqbal represents a shift that is just as important as Twom-
bly’s. After Iqbal, courts must consider whether a factual allegation is 
conclusory or nonconclusory for purposes of pleading requirements.47 
If an allegation is nonconclusory, the court must accept it as true.48 If 
an allegation is conclusory, the court does not have to accept it as 
true.49 The court then examines all the nonconclusory allegations to-
gether to determine whether they show a plausible entitlement to re-
lief.50 
 Note the important point here. If the goal is notice, the distinc-
tions between conclusory and nonconclusory allegations, and between 
plausible and possible entitlement to relief, are largely meaningless. If, 
instead, the goal is greater factual detail for a preliminary merits as-
sessment, then the distinctions from Twombly and Iqbal make a lot of 
                                                                                                                      
41 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954. 
42 Id. at 1953; Scott Dodson, Beyond Twombly, Civ. Proc. & Fed. Cts. Blog (May 18, 2009), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2009/05/beyond-twombly-by-prof-scott-dodson.html. 
43 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 See id. at 1950, 1953–54; Dodson, supra note 42. 
48 See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950, 1953–54. 
49 See id. 
50 See id. 
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sense.51 When recent congressional experimentations with heightened 
pleading are examined together with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Twombly and Iqbal, it seems obvious that the United States is undergoing 
a momentous transformation in federal civil pleading standards. This 
transformation shifts U.S. pleading from its traditional notice-based 
regime to a fact-based system looking beyond notice and toward the 
merits of a claim.52 
B. Foreign Pleading Models 
 The recent trend of U.S. federal pleading toward factual suffi-
ciency is far more akin to the rest of the world than the notice pleading 
regime that existed before Twombly. 
 Germany requires “specific fact pleading and does not permit 
mere notice pleading.”53 The complaint is factually extensive and de-
tailed, accompanied by available documentary evidence and explana-
tions of any circumstantial evidence.54 It also includes a proposed 
means of proof that the plaintiff will use to establish the facts stated.55 
For example, in a simple negligence case based on a car accident, the 
plaintiff’s complaint usually will include “specific allegations of pre-
cisely how and why the accident occurred, an identified source of proof 
for each allegation, the amounts of damage set forth with precision, 
[and] attached copies of bills, police and medical reports, and even 
photographs to support the allegations.”56 This gives the judge a com-
plete picture of the claim as well as a sense of the strengths and weak-
nesses of the plaintiff’s case so that the judge can tailor the litigation 
process in an efficient manner.57 
                                                                                                                      
51 See Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 849, 870–71 (2010) (arguing that Iqbal’s “thick screening 
model” is an assessment of the likelihood of success on the merits); Kevin M. Clermont & 
Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 821, 824–28 (2010) 
(arguing that after Iqbal, plaintiffs must plead factual support, and even some evidence, to 
survive a motion to dismiss). 
52 See Dodson, supra note 23, at 463. This Article does not equate the fact-based plead-
ing of Twombly and Iqbal  to the Code Pleading that dominated U.S. pleading before the 
Federal Rules: there are significant differences. See Kevin M. Clermont, Three Myths About 
Twombly-Iqbal (Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers, Paper No. 76, 2010), available at 
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clsops_papers/76. 
53 Peter L. Murray & Rolf Stürner, German Civil Justice 198 (2004). 
54 See id. at 197–98. 
55 See id.; Peter F. Schlosser, Lectures on Civil-Law Litigation Systems and American Coopera-
tion with Those Systems, 45 U. Kan. L. Rev. 9, 12 (1996). 
56 Murray & Stürner, supra note 53, at 198. 
57 See id. 
8 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 34:1 
 Japan also requires fact pleading. The complaint must “specif[y] 
and particulariz[e]” the claim, include the facts on which it is based, 
delineate “relevant . . . indirect facts” related to the claim, and itemize 
the evidence corresponding to each point the plaintiff will prove.58 It is 
not sufficient to allege ultimate facts.59 The underlying evidentiary facts 
that need to be established to support the claim must also be asserted.60 
 Similarly, England requires a concise statement of the claim which 
must include “a concise statement of the facts on which the claimant 
relies,” and must specify the remedy that the claimant seeks.61 For cer-
tain claims, such as allegations of fraud, the claimant may also be re-
quired to provide additional details.62 The rules also permit claimants 
to include relevant documents in their statement of claim.63 
 Thus, the United States appears to be shifting away from the no-
tice-based exceptionalism toward a fact-based model more akin to the 
pleading standards in the rest of the world.64 Of course, the trend is not 
direct. The plausibility standard’s focus on facts is designed as a merits-
screening tool;65 foreign fact-pleading models, on the other hand, are 
designed as issue-development tools.66 But the point here is more gen-
eral; by moving away from pure notice and toward factual sufficiency, 
U.S. pleading is beginning to look a lot more like the global norm of 
fact-based pleading standards. 
II. The Role and Status of Judges 
 This Part studies the role and status of judges in a comparative 
context. Like pleading standards, the relatively passive role and high 
prestige of U.S. judges have been viewed as examples of “American ex-
ceptionalism.”67 The unique status of the U.S. judge relates to proce-
dural practices that set him or her apart from others. With regard to 
status, this Part explores why the “passive” U.S. judge occupies a more 
                                                                                                                      
58 Takeshi Kojima, Japanese Civil Procedure in Comparative Law Perspective, 46 U. Kan. L. 
Rev. 687, 697 (1998). 
59 See id. 
60 See id. 
61 Neil Andrews, English Civil Procedure: Fundamentals of the New Civil Jus-
tice System 254 (2003). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 256. 
64 See Dodson, supra note 23, at 463. 
65 See Bone, supra note 51, at 853. 
66 See, e.g., Kojima, supra note 58, at 697. 
67 See Samuel R. Gross, The American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litigation, 85 
Mich. L. Rev. 734, 746, 752 (1987). 
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prestigious position in society and the legal profession compared with 
the more “active” Continental European judges.68 Further, there is an 
inquiry about convergence regarding the roles of U.S. judges and their 
counterparts in other countries.69 
A. Some Basic Differences 
 Significant differences in judicial roles begin with the training and 
selection of trial court judges, although these differences continue 
throughout the judge’s career. Shortly after law school, a Continental 
European graduate must generally choose a career either in private 
practice or as a member of the judicial corps.70 A lateral move from pri-
vate practice to the judiciary is rare, though it is the norm in the United 
States and other countries sharing a common law tradition.71 Although 
some civil law judges have had practical experience, this experience is 
typically in the public sector: a prosecutor’s office or the ministry of jus-
tice.72 In short, the civil law method of selection and advancement fol-
lows a civil service model while the U.S. model is “political” at both the 
state and federal court levels.73 Great Britain, Canada, and Australia fol-
low the U.S. model in that judges typically come to the bench after years 
of practice, though they are appointed rather than elected.74 
 Probably the most widely noted and often praised distinction be-
tween the two systems is the more active role of the civil law judge in 
conducting litigation.75 In the civil law system, the judge is expected to 
                                                                                                                      
 
68 See infra text accompanying notes 93--99. 
69 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
70 See Mullenix, supra note 5, at 8. See generally Carlo Guarnieri & Patrizia Peder-
zoli, The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of Courts and Democracy (C.A. 
Thomas ed., 2002) (providing a detailed explanation of the appointment process and 
career structure for the judiciaries of the United States and six European countries). 
71 Guarnieri & Pederzoli, supra note 70, at 20. 
72 See Daniel J. Meador, German Appellate Judges: Career Patterns and American-English 
Comparisons, 67 Judicature 16, 25–26 (1983). 
73 See id. at 31–34. 
74 See Dep’t of Justice Can., Canada’s Court System 11 (2005), http://www.jus- 
tice.gc.ca/eng/dept-min/pub/ccs-ajc/pdf/courten.pdf; see also Guarnieri & Pederzoli, 
supra note 70, at 20, 21; Julie-Anne Kennedy & Anthony Ashton Tarr, The Judiciary in Con-
temporary Society: Australia, 25 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 251, 251–53 (1993). 
75 See John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
823, 830--41(1985) [hereinafter Langbein, The German Advantage] (comparing U.S. civil 
procedure to German civil procedure and finding the former inferior in several respects, 
including an impaired fact-gathering system due to its adversarial nature and the less active 
role of the judge). The most frequently compared system in this regard has been that of 
Germany. See Benjamin Kaplan, Arthur T. von Mehren & Rudolf Schaefer, Phases of German 
Civil Procedure I, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1193, 1193--98 (1958) (seminal article describing Ger-
10 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 34:1 
know the key facts in advance and guide the process.76 A number of 
U.S comparative law scholars see this civil law practice as both more 
efficient and more likely to achieve a just result than the Anglo-
American tradition, where the passive trial judge leaves the entire proc-
ess up to the lawyers.77 But others are skeptical about the ability of the 
active and involved civil law judge to retain objectivity and avoid arriv-
ing at premature conclusions regarding the merits of the case.78 
                                                                                                                     
 Another area where many U.S. and foreign observers find civil law 
procedure superior is the designation of expert witnesses. In European 
litigation, this designation is typically performed by the judge rather 
than the opposing parties.79 The U.S. practice of using highly paid 
“hired guns” has been criticized as completely inimical to the concept 
 
man civil procedure); see also William B. Fisch, Recent Developments in West German Civil Pro-
cedure, 6 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 221, 221--23 (1983) (comprehensive report on 
the effect of German procedural reforms in the 1970s). Professor Langbein’s critical arti-
cle generated a round of responses, with the sharpest criticism coming from Ronald J. 
Allen, Stefan Kock, Kurt Riechenberg, and D. Toby Rosen. See generally Ronald J. Allen, 
Stefan Kock, Kurt Riechenberg & D. Toby Rosen, The German Advantage in Civil Proce-
dure: A Plea for More Details and Fewer Generalities in Comparative Scholarship, 82 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 705 (1988) [hereinafter Allen et al., A Plea] (criticizing The German Advantage and 
favorably comparing U.S. civil procedure to that of Germany ); John C. Reitz, Why We Prob-
ably Cannot Adopt The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 987 (1990) 
(offering a less aggressive criticism of The German Advantage). Professor Langbein re-
sponded to Professor Allen’s criticism with his own criticism of Allen’s argument. See gener-
ally John H. Langbein, Trashing The German Advantage, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 763 (1988) 
(defending The German Advantage and criticizing A Plea). To this, Allen responded in turn. 
See generally Ronald J. Allen, Idealization and Caricature in Comparative Scholarship, 82 Nw. U. 
L. Rev. 785 (1988) [hereinafter Allen, Idealization] (defending A Plea). This heated debate 
has spawned additional literature more recently. See generally Michael Bohlander, The 
German Advantage Revisited: An Inside View of German Civil Procedure in the Nineties, 13 Tul. 
Eur. & Civ. L.F. 25 (1998) (comparing Langbein’s and Allen’s arguments in addition to 
providing his own insight into the German system); Bradley Bryan, Justice and Advantage in 
Civil Procedure: Langbein’s Conception of Comparative Law and Procedural Justice in Question, 11 
Tulsa J. Comp. & Int’l L. 521 (2004) (favorably comparing the German method of civil 
procedure to the U.S. method through the lenses of the Langbein and Allen articles). 
76 Ernst C. Stiefel & James R. Maxeiner, Civil Justice Reform in the United States—
Opportunity for Learning from “Civilized” European Procedure Instead of Continued Isolation?, 42 
Am. J. Comp. L. 147, 157 (1994). John Langbein argues that “by assigning judges rather 
than lawyers to investigate the facts, the Germans avoid the most troublesome aspects of 
our practice,” and that the judge “soon knows the case as well as the litigants do.” Lang-
bein, The German Advantage, supra note 75, at 824, 831–32. 
77 See, e.g., Stiefel & Maxeiner, supra note 76, at 156–57. 
78 See Allen et al., A Plea, supra note 75, at 728–29. One of the articles criticizing Lang-
bein’s thesis cites as an example a German judge seemingly leading an unsure witness to 
the judge’s desired conclusion in an auto accident case. Id. 
79 Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 75, at 837–38. 
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that a trial involves the search for “truth.”80 In contrast, in Continental 
litigation, the judge is responsible for both the selection and instruc-
tion of the expert, though an attempt is made to secure the agreement 
of the parties.81 The goal is to choose a neutral expert who will assist 
the judge and not either of the parties.82 Although Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 706 gives U.S. judges the authority to appoint their own ex-
perts,83 this authority is seldom exercised.84 One possible reason for 
this is that the judge is not familiar enough with the facts of the case to 
choose an expert.85 Another explanation for why U.S. judges do not 
exercise their authority under Rule 706 to call experts,86 or Rule 614 to 
call ordinary fact witnesses,87 has to do with deep-seated cultural atti-
tudes about the judge’s proper role in conducting a trial.88 
 Other scholars contend that the use of court-appointed experts in 
Germany has not been an unmitigated success.89 For example, well-
qualified experts are difficult to find.90 Consequently, judges seldom 
use their authority to appoint experts, such that the choice is not be-
tween court-appointed experts and partisan experts, but between court-
appointed experts and no experts at all.91 Additionally, scholars worry 
that judges may be simply delegating to experts rather than overseeing 
them.92 
 There is irony in the fact that, whereas the U.S. judges have a less 
active role in conducting the trial, acting more like “umpires” than 
“managers,” they are nevertheless seen as more of an authority figure in 
the courtroom, or as some have suggested, “culture heroes, even paren-
tal figures.”93 Why should this be so? 
                                                                                                                      
 
80 See id. at 835–36. Professor Langbein argues that “[t]he battle of experts tends to baffle 
the trier, especially in jury courts. If the experts do not cancel each other out, the advantage 
is likely to be with the expert whose forensic skills are the more enticing.” Id. at 836. 
81 Id. at 836–37. 
82 Id. at 837. 
83 See Fed. R. Evid. 706. 
84 See Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 75, at 841. 
85 See id.; see also Jack B. Weinstein et al., Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 706[01], at 706-8 
to -14 (1996); John Henry Merryman, Foreign Law as a Problem, 19 Stan. J. Int’l L. 151, 
171 (1983). 
86 Fed. R. Evid. 706. 
87 Fed. R. Evid. 614. 
88 See Reitz, supra note 75, at 992–95. 
89 See Allen et al., A Plea, supra note 75, at 737–38. 
90 See id. at 739. 
91 See id. at 738–40. 
92 See id. 
93 See John Henry Merryman & Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo, The Civil Law Tradition 
34 (3d ed. 2007); Kevin J. Mitchell, Neither Purse Nor Sword: Lessons Europe Can Learn from 
12 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 34:1 
 There may be several factors, not the least of which is the previ-
ously mentioned political selection of U.S. judges, as well as the pattern 
of U.S. judges embarking on a judicial career only after achieving some 
degree of success in law practice. The relatively low social standing of 
the typical European judge may also be a factor.94 The role’s passive 
character may give the U.S judge an aura of being “above the fray” in 
contrast to the “hands-on” civil law judge.95 Additionally, the power to 
issue contempt orders adds to the clout of the U.S. judge.96 Moreover, 
the managerial authority of the civil law judges, while extensive, is exer-
cised within a narrower band than that of U.S. judges who have a larger 
range of discretion and opportunities for creativity, thereby “making 
                                                                                                                      
American Courts’ Struggle for Democratic Legitimacy, 38 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 653, 659 
(2007). Public opinion polls support these anecdotal observations about the prestige rank-
ings of U.S. judges. E.g., Cynthia L. Cates & Wayne V. McIntosh, Law and the Web of 
Society 75 (2001). In addressing this issue, two scholars have noted: 
Clearly, the judicial office carries with it tremendous prestige. Generally speak-
ing, public opinion ranks judges near the top of the occupational heap in terms 
of status. Thus, for example, one study of occupational prestige ranked judges 
generally at about the high position of doctors, with college professors, “regu-
lar” lawyers, airline pilots, and nurses trailing behind. Supreme Court justices 
outranked even doctors. 
Id. In a Harris poll dated August 8, 2006, seventy percent of those polled “would trust” 
judges, compared to twenty-seven percent for lawyers. Doctors and Teachers Most Trusted 
Among 22 Occupations and Professions: Fewer Adults Trust President to Tell the Truth, The Free 
Library (Aug. 8, 2006), http://www.thefreelibrary.com (navigate to “Date”; select “August 
8, 2006”; navigate to “PR Newswire” under the “Business” section; scroll down to hyperlink 
with the article title and follow hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 20, 2010). Comparative statis-
tics regarding the relative prestige of Continental lawyers and judges are not readily avail-
able. Nevertheless, the self-image of the two groups is relevant. In a 1972 poll, only twenty 
percent of the German judges thought that they enjoyed the prestige due to them by vir-
tue of their profession, whereas forty-three percent of the attorneys thought they enjoyed 
such prestige. See Allen et al., A Plea, supra note 75, at 747–48. 
94 See Merryman & Pérez-Perdomo, supra note 93, at 110 (“The upper classes, who 
get the best education and who have influential friends, tend to have privileged access to, 
and to dominate, practice and academic life. Judicial posts are frequently filled by those 
who are rising to the middle class from humbler social origins.”). 
95 See Gross, supra note 67, at 746. One of the many articles joining in the academic 
debate over The German Advantage cites the more passive role of the U.S. judge as contrib-
uting to the “prestige and autonomy” of U.S. judges as well as making them “more effec-
tive as guarantors of individual rights.” See id.; see also Stephan Landsman, The Adversary 
System: A Description and Defense 50 (1984). Whether the trend in the U.S. toward a 
more involved role for judges would bring about a reduction in this level of prestige is 
uncertain. Perhaps there are enough other attributes of U.S. judges, noted in this Article, 
which would prevent any reduction of prestige. 
96 See Merryman & Pérez-Perdomo, supra note 93, at 123–24. 
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law” as well as interpreting it.97 The role of stare decisis in the common 
law system is seen as central to the judge’s more creative role.98 Al-
though the hierarchical structure of courts in Germany, for example, 
results in strong adherence to higher court decisions, there is less room 
for creativity when interpreting the law.99 
 This greater range for creativity in the United States is particularly 
striking in the context of judicial review of legislative and executive ac-
tion, a power that can be exercised by state as well as federal judges. 
Although judicial review in the United States dates back to the 1803 
Supreme Court decision in Marbury v. Madison,100 across the Atlantic it 
has only been the norm since World War II in Western Europe, and the 
fall of communism in Eastern Europe.101 Nevertheless, in Europe there 
is a strict separation between the new constitutional courts and the or-
dinary courts.102 In Europe, only constitutional courts have the author-
ity to strike down acts of the legislature, whereas even trial court judges 
can do this in the United States.103 Nevertheless, in Germany and Italy, 
                                                                                                                      
 
97 Id. at 37 (“Civil law judges are not culture heroes or parental figures, as [in the 
common law system]. Their image is that of a civil servant who performs important but 
essentially uncreative functions.”). 
98 Mitchell, supra note 93, at 659. One commentator compares the recognized role of 
such reputable judges as Coke, Mansfield, Marshall, and Cardozo as lawgivers in the com-
mon law tradition to legislators and politicians, such as Justinian or Napoleon, in civil law 
history. Id. at 660. 
99 See Mirjan R. Damaška, The Faces of Justice and State Authority 33–34 
(1986); Allen et al., A Plea, supra note 75, at 755 (quoting Damaška, supra, at 42 n.37) 
(“[T]he result is a system of precedent that lacks the crucial element that maintains the 
vibrancy of the Anglo-American common law system: A ‘Continental judge does not weigh 
the symmetry of factual situations which, under the aegis of stare decisis, permits fine dis-
tinctions and thus assures the flexible growth of the law. Instead, he seeks ever more con-
crete rules in prior decisions, disregarding the enveloping factual context.’”). 
100 Mitchell, supra note 93, at 677, 679–80. 
101 Alec Stone Sweet, Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review—And Why It May Not 
Matter, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 2744, 2766–69 (2003). Whereas Austria, at the urging of Hans 
Kelsen, established a constitutional court in 1920, its jurisdiction only extended to gov-
ernmental structural issues, with the emphasis on abstract preventive norm control and 
not on the kinds of human and civil rights dealt with by most contemporary European 
constitutional courts. See id.; see also Mitchell, supra note 93, at 671–76 (discussing the “Kel-
senian” constitutional court). 
102 Mitchell, supra note 93, at 675. 
103 See id. at 675, 680. At least one comparative scholar sees virtue in the Continental 
division of labor between various court systems: 
We must remember that the decision to isolate important components of 
constitutional and administrative-law jurisdiction outside the ordinary courts 
in Germany lowers the political stakes in judicial office, by comparison with 
our system, in which every federal district judge (and for that matter, every 
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members of the ordinary judiciary have the ability to refer any constitu-
tional issues that arise in a civil or criminal case to the constitutional 
court.104 This limited degree of constitutional “involvement” arguably 
constitutes some measure of “convergence.”105 
 Also significant is the difference between ordinary courts and con-
stitutional courts regarding methods of judge selection. In contrast to 
the civil service career judiciary model, constitutional court judges of-
ten have a background in politics or as law school faculty members.106 
Their career paths are closer to those of a common law judge. The ap-
pointment process is political, typically by a majority or super-majority 
vote of the Parliament.107 
 Common law judges have a greater identity as individuals, strik-
ingly illustrated by the fact that they typically issue concurring and dis-
senting opinions. This may be a factor that enhances their prestige with 
the practicing bar and the general public. Civil law judges tend to be 
“invisible.” Their opinions are typically unanimous and anonymous.108 
This is true of both the ordinary courts and the constitutional courts, 
although less so for constitutional court judges.109 
B. Convergence of Judicial Roles 
 The most widely noted trend toward convergence is the increased 
managerial responsibilities of the U.S. judge, primarily in the “big 
case.”110 The complexity of class action certification and settlement 
                                                                                                                      
 
state judge) purports to brandish the Constitution and thus to be able to 
wreak major social and institutional change. 
Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 75, at 853. 
104 See Mauro Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World, 74–76 
(1971); John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons from Europe, 
82 Tex. L. Rev. 1671, 1688 (2004). 
105 See Cappelletti, supra note 104, at 84. 
106 See Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 104, at 1681–82. 
107See id. The exception is France, “where the President of the Republic and the presi-
dents of the two houses of Parliament each appoint three members of the Conseil Consti-
tutionnel.” Id. at 1681. 
108 See id. at 1681–82; Merryman & Pérez-Perdomo, supra note 93, at 37. The German 
and Spanish constitutional courts do permit dissents, but they are rare. See Ferejohn & 
Pasquino, supra note 104, at 1693–95. In Italy, a proposal was briefly considered that would 
permit only anonymous or unsigned dissents, but even this was rejected. See id. 
109 See Merryman & Pérez-Perdomo, supra note 93, at 35, 36. Speaking of the ordi-
nary civil law courts, Professor Merryman asks rhetorically, “who knows the name of a civil 
law judge?” Id. at 36. 
110 See Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Some Comparative Reflections of First Instance Civil Pro-
cedure: Recent Reforms in German Civil Procedure and in the Federal Rules, 63 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 609, 623–27 (1988); see also Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Authorized Managerialism Under the 
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hearings have motivated federal judges to take a number of actions not 
in keeping with their traditional common law “umpire” role.111  Mana-
gerial techniques include departing from the trial plan proposed by the 
parties, appointing special “science panels,” applying flexible eviden-
tiary rules, and delegating the implementation of an alternative dispute 
resolution plan to magistrates.112 Such innovations suggest a willingness 
by judges to override the lawyer’s role in conducting litigation, leading 
one observer to conclude that “the American federal judge presiding 
over complex litigation now often acts like his or her civil law counter-
part.”113 This is true not only in complex business and commercial law-
suits, but also with respect to public law litigation involving civil rights 
and institutional reform issues.114 
 At the same time, there has been a contrary trend in some Euro-
pean countries toward more party-adversarial practices and conse-
quently less of a “hands-on” role for the judge.115 In January 2004, Italy 
                                                                                                                      
 
Federal Rules—and the Extent of Convergence with Civil Law Judging, 36 Sw. U. L. Rev. 191, 
193–202 (2007) (providing a detailed, rule-by-rule listing of changes that have increased 
the managerial role of the federal judge). For somewhat differing views as to the desirabil-
ity of this trend, compare Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 376, 403–30 
(1962), with Robert F. Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case Management, 
Two-Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 Rutgers L. Rev. 253, 260–
67 (1985). 
111 See Rowe, supra note 110, at 196–98. Although many intensively managed cases in 
U.S. federal courts have been class actions, the trend within the United States is toward 
more active case management even in non-class cases. At the same time, other countries 
are experimenting with “class like” litigation, further enhancing the convergence between 
the United States and the rest of the world. See Richard B. Cappalli & Claudio Consolo, 
Class Actions for Continental Europe? A Preliminary Inquiry, 6 Temp. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 217, 
225 (1992); Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil—A Model for Civil Law Countries, 51 Am. J. 
Comp. L. 311, 312–13 (2003) (listing countries); Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation 
Across the Atlantic and the Future of American Exceptionalism, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 41–42 (2009) 
(observing foreign convergence toward U.S. class action models); Edward F. Sherman, 
American Class Actions: Significant Features and Developing Alternatives in Foreign Legal Systems, 
215 F.R.D. 130, 133 (2003). 
112 See Mullenix, supra note 5, at 17–20. 
113 Id. at 20. 
114 See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 
1281, 1284 (1976). 
115 See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard & Angelo Dondi, Responsibilities of Judges and Advocates 
in Civil and Common Law: Some Lingering Misconceptions Concerning Civil Lawsuits, 39 Cor-
nell Int’l L.J. 59, 69 (2006) (noting that Italian procedural reforms for alternative dis-
pute resolution procedures for commercial cases sharply restrict the role of the judge); 
Astrid Stadler, The Multiple Roles of Judges in Modern Civil Litigation, 27 Hastings Int’l & 
Comp. L. Rev. 55, 56 (2003) (noting that new Spanish civil procedure rules limit the role 
of judges); see also Cecilia Carrara, Critical Analysis of the New Italian Rule of Arbitration in 
Corporate Matters, 7 Int’l Arb. L. Rev. 8, 10 (2004) (analyzing certain aspects of 2004 Ital-
ian legislative reform of commercial arbitration procedures). But see Andrés de la Oliva 
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adopted new rules providing alternative dispute resolution for com-
mercial cases that sharply restricted the role of the judge, with the 
preparation of the factual and legal issues left largely to the lawyers for 
the parties.116 The 2001 Spanish Civil Procedure Rules somewhat re-
duced the active rule of the judge by, among other things, substituting 
a system of cross-examination by counsel in place of examination of 
witnesses by the judge.117 
 In Germany, as a result of the 1977 revisions to the Code of Civil 
Procedure, there has been a trend toward a “concentrated trial,” or at 
least toward making the trial more continuous than in the past.118 Con-
centration involves the development of a cause prior to the actual trial, 
and is a characteristic traditionally associated with the common law trial 
procedure and attributed to the practicalities of the jury system.119 One 
observer attributed this change to an increased concern with promot-
ing the value of efficiency, but at the same time perhaps giving less em-
phasis to “other justice values,” a trend also observed in the United 
States in regard to “managerial judges.”120 In addition to Germany, Aus-
tria has moved significantly in the direction of greater concentration.121 
This movement has been accompanied by a greater emphasis on “oral-
ity,” historically regarded as a characteristic of common law proce-
dure.122 Additionally, Germany and Austria have moved away from the 
concept of a “documentary curtain” whereby a hearing judge takes the 
evidence and prepares a written summary, while a different judge or 
group of judges hear arguments and render a decision.123 
                                                                                                                      
Santos, Spanish Civil Procedure Act 2000: Flying Over Common Law and Civil Law Traditions, in 
Common Law, Civil Law and The Future of Categories 67 ( Janet Walker & Oscar G. 
Chase eds., 2009) (suggesting that Spanish civil procedure reform has actually enlarged 
aspects of the judge’s role). 
116 See Hazard & Dondi, supra note 115, at 69; see also Carrara, supra note 115, at 11. 
117 See Stadler, supra note 115, at 56. But see Santos, supra note 115, at 67. 
118 Mehren, supra note 110, at 615. 
119 Id. at 611, 615. 
120 Id. at 627. 
121 Merryman & Pérez-Perdomo, supra note 93, at 113. 
122 See id. at 114–15. 
123 Id. at 115. According to Merryman and Pérez-Perdomo: 
A trend toward immediacy in civil proceedings carries with it a trend toward oral-
ity, and orality is promoted by the trend toward concentration. Civil law proce-
duralists think of the three matters as related to one another and one frequently 
encounters discussions in which concentration, immediacy and orality are ad-
vanced as interrelated proposals for reform in the law of civil procedure. 
Id. 
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 There has also been a movement in Europe toward decreased use 
of “collegial” or multiple judges in first instance courts. In Germany, it 
seems that most decisions are now rendered by a single judge, rather 
than a panel of three, although there is some question about how 
much this has contributed to making litigation more efficient.124 Nev-
ertheless, this change makes the structure of the German trial more 
like the U.S. trial, and makes the authority of the German judge more 
similar to his or her U.S. counterpart. 
                                                                                                                     
 The German Civil Procedure Rules Act of 2001 places somewhat 
less emphasis on de novo review of facts by second instance courts.125 
The original draft of these Rules mandated that courts of appeal would 
only decide points of law, which would have moved much further in the 
direction of U.S. practice.126 The reformers’ goal was to strengthen the 
fact-finding role of first instance judges.127 But after much discussion, 
this far-reaching change was not included in the final version of the 
Act.128 
 Nevertheless, one should be cautious in generalizing about “civil 
law” procedure. There always has been diversity among European 
countries, and diversity is apparently increasing. To give one striking 
example of a long-standing deviation from the civil law model, in some 
cantons of Switzerland, judges are elected and come to the bench with 
prior practice experience.129 Russia is now classified as a civil law coun-
try, but between 1995 and 2002 Russia experimented with some “com-
mon law like” features involving a more passive role for judges.130 Addi-
tionally, Germany and France are the two countries whose judiciaries 
are most often compared to that of the United States.131 Scholars have 
cautioned against lumping together the judiciaries of these two coun-
tries, pointing out, among other things, that German judges are more 
 
124 See Fisch, supra note 75, at 227–36; Mehren, supra note 110, at 623; Stadler, supra 
note 115, at 75. 
125 Stadler, supra note 115, at 60. 
126 See Giesela Rühl, Preparing Germany for the 21st Century: The Reform of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, 6 German L.J. 910, 922 (2005); Stadler, supra note 115, at 60. 
127 See Stadler, supra note 115, at 60. 
128 Id. 
129 See Samuel P. Baumgartner, Civil Procedure Reform in Switzerland and the Role of Legal 
Transplants, in 49 Supreme Ct. L. Rev. 75, 83 (Janet Walker & Oscar G. Chase eds., Lex-
isNexis 2d ed. 2010). 
130 See Dimitry Maleshin, The Russian Style of Civil Procedure, 21 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 
543, 556 (2007). 
131 See John Henry Merryman, How Others Do It: The French and German Judiciaries, 61 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 1865, 1865 (1988). 
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“active” than their French brethren.132 Further, such scholars have 
noted that if a “model” of a civil law judge “were extrapolated from all 
the civil law jurisdictions, he or she would look more Italian than 
French or German.”133 
C. The Influence of International Arbitration 
 Many transnational business and commercial disputes are now de-
cided by arbitrators rather than judges.134 There seems to be more con-
vergence, harmonization, and “mixing” of common and civil law prac-
tices in arbitration proceedings than in the courtroom.135 For example, 
the International Bar Association Rules of Evidence (IBA Rules), which 
were drafted by arbitrators from a number of different countries and 
are often used for international arbitration, combine the historically 
common law practice of live cross-examination of witnesses with the 
feature of free assessment of evidence and rejection of exclusionary 
rules, a characteristic of civil law courts.136 Discovery, as provided in the 
IBA Rules, represents a compromise between the very broad scope al-
lowed in the United States and the much narrower scope of discovery 
permitted in Europe.137 While dissenting opinions by civil law judges 
are extremely rare, they are quite common in international arbitration 
proceedings.138 Although the use of tribunal appointed expert wit-
nesses is possible, experts in international commercial arbitration are 
more often appointed by parties. Nevertheless, the Chartered Institute 
of Arbitrators has attempted to change this practice.139 An interesting 
question is whether some of the “blended” procedures now used by in-
ternational arbitrators will gradually be adopted by national court sys-
tems.140 
                                                                                                                      
132 See id. 
133 See id. at 1867. 
134 Steven C. Nelson, Alternatives to Litigation of International Disputes, 23 Int’l Law. 187, 
187 (1989). 
135 See Pierre A. Karrer, The Civil and Common Law Divide: An International Arbitrator Tells 
It Like He Sees It, 63 Disp. Res. J. 72, at 74–75, 81 (2008). 
136 Id. at 74. 
137 See Seth Berman, Crossborder Challenges for e-Discovery, Bus. L. Int’l, May 2010, at 
123, 125–26. 
138 Karrer, supra note 135, at 80. There is, however, some disagreement on how an arbi-
trator’s time spent on a dissenting opinion should be compensated. See id. at 81. 
139 See id. at 77–78. 
140 See id. at 75. This has already happened to some extent in England. See id. 
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D. Decodification and Global Judicialization 
 “Decodification”  involves a number of trends.141 One trend is the 
growth of “special legislation” that treats subjects dealt with by code 
provisions but “differ ideologically from the code and are in this sense 
incompatible with it.”142 Examples of such systems of special statutory 
law include labor law, intellectual property law, company law, and secu-
rities law.143 Also significant is the growth of judge-made law in the field 
of torts, a change that is inconsistent with traditional civil law ideol-
ogy.144 These developments tend to undercut legislative supremacy and 
require European judges to make choices that are similar to those 
made by judges in the “common law world.”145 
 While legislation and codes have become less significant, constitu-
tions have grown in importance. This shift is the result of the post-
World War II and post-Communist establishment of constitutional 
courts, and the consequent ability of dissenting public officials as well 
as ordinary citizens to challenge the legality of parliamentary legisla-
tion and executive decrees.146 Although the power to strike down legis-
lation on constitutional grounds is strictly limited to the separate con-
stitutional courts,147 judges in the ordinary court system have still been 
affected by the phenomenon of “constitutionalization.” Even in ordi-
nary litigation where there is no per se constitutional challenge, the text 
of the constitution may influence the interpretation of the relevant 
law.148 Because the judges of the ordinary courts must be guided in 
their decisions by the constitutional judges, some characteristics of the 
latter may rub off on the former. In fact, the lines of jurisdiction be-
                                                                                                                      
141 Merryman, supra note 131, at 1868. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 See id. at 1869 (“The [French] code provisions are so rudimentary and empty of 
substance that judges have had to create the applicable law on a case-by case basis. The 
effective law of torts is not found in the code but outside it, in widely published, consulted 
and cited court decisions.”). 
145 See id. 
146 See id. at 1870–71. 
147 See supra text accompanying notes 102--104. 
148 See Merryman, supra note 131, at 1872. Merryman writes as follows: 
When a choice among competing interpretations of a law must be made, the 
one that seems more consistent with the constitution will normally be fa-
vored. When a party argues that the constitution favors its position, the judge 
must consider the argument and in so doing must interpret and apply the 
constitution. 
Id. 
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tween constitutional courts and ordinary courts are not always clear, 
occasionally leading to conflict. An example of such conflict occurred 
in Italy between the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Constitutional 
Court “regarding the right to counsel in criminal proceedings and the 
retroactive effect of holding that a statute deprived an accused of the 
constitutional right to counsel.”149 
 There are political and structural factors at work in both the 
“Western Common-Law Democracies” and the “European Romano-
Germanic Democracies” that permit and encourage an expansion of 
judicial power at the expense of the legislative and executive 
branches.150 Additionally, the trend appears stronger in the Romano-
Germanic countries, which seem more resistant to judicial activism 
based on historical deference to legislative supremacy.151 The factors 
bringing about this “judicialization” include separation of powers, a 
politics of rights—enabled in part by the new constitutional courts— 
interest and opposition-group use of the courts, ineffective majoritarian 
institutions, positive perceptions of the courts, and “wilful delegation of 
majoritarian institutions.”152 The delegation of majoritarian institutions 
occurs when legislators fear voting or even taking a position on contro-
versial questions, and are only too happy to let judges make such deci-
sions.153 Although these factors mainly influence the constitutional and 
administrative courts, these effects may “spill over” onto the ordinary 
courts. 
 The EU is another powerful “outside” influence on member-state 
judges.  For example, national laws that violate the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights are subject to challenge before the European 
Commission and Court of Human Rights.154 By undercutting the abso-
lute sovereignty of national parliaments, EU courts have given addi-
tional powers and responsibilities to the various national courts, thus 
furthering “convergence.” As one scholar noted, “[t]hat Great Britain, 
mother country of the Common Law, is a member of the EEC and a 
                                                                                                                      
149 John Henry Merryman & Vincenzo Vigoriti, When Courts Collide: Constitution and 
Cassation in Italy, 15 Am. J. Comp. L. 665, 665 (1966--1967). At the core of this controversy 
was a conflict between the Code of Penal Procedure of 1931, amendments adopted in 
1955, and the Republican Constitution of 1948. Id. 
150 See C. Neal Tate & Torbjörn Vallinder, Judicialization and the Future of Politics and Pol-
icy, in The Global Expansion of Judicial Power 515, 516–19 (C. Neal Tate & Torbjörn 
Vallinder eds. 1995). 
151 See id. at 518–23. 
152 Id. at 526. 
153 See id. at 526–27. 
154 See Merryman, supra note 131, at 1873. 
2011] Global Civil Procedure Trends in the 21st Century 21 
party to the Human Rights Convention, suggests the possibility, indeed 
the necessity of a rapprochement of the civil and common law tradi-
tions.”155 
 One more possible influence in favor of greater convergence is the 
ALI/UNIDROIT Principles and Rules of Civil Procedure, a set of stan-
dards drafted jointly by a group of scholars from the United States and 
Europe with a view toward universal “standards for adjudication of 
transnational commercial disputes.”156 Although no country has 
adopted the Principles or Rules in whole or substantial part, they have 
nonetheless received significant attention on both sides of the Atlan-
tic.157 Although the Principles and Rules attempt to bridge differences 
between legal systems, there is something of a “tilt” in favor of Euro-
pean Civil Law. For example, the Principles and Rules generally keep 
“discovery” under the control of the judge as part of the “trial” rather 
than a “pre-trial” process.158 The Principles also contain a strong state-
ment on “Court Responsibility for Direction of the Proceeding.”159 Al-
though this might seem strange to a rural common law judge, a mod-
ern federal judge handling a large case load would feel quite at home 
with these words. 
III. Comparative Lessons 
 As the previous Parts have shown, convergence exists in at least two 
areas of traditional American exceptionalism: pleading standards and 
the role of the judge. This Part addresses what these convergences 
might mean for domestic and transnational civil procedure. There are 
both promises and perils. 
A. Comparative Promises 
 First, at a minimum, these convergences ought to make compara-
tive studies more approachable and thus might enrich the debates cur-
                                                                                                                      
155 Id. 
156 Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure (Am. Law Inst. & UNIDROIT), 
Unif. L. Rev. 2004-4, at 758 (2004) [hereinafter ALI/UNIDROIT Principles]. 
157 See James M. Klebba, The Federal Rules at the Age of 70 Years—A Possible Model for the 
Implementation of the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure, 57 
Pravni Zivot, no. 12, 2008, at 203, 206–08 (paper delivered at the Proceedings of the 
Annual Conference of the Mt. Kopaonik School of Natural Law on the Theme of “Law and 
International Integration”). 
158 Id. at 204, 206–07. 
159 ALI/UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 156, at 784. 
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rently surrounding these two areas in U.S. academic circles.160 U.S. 
proceduralists are notoriously provincial.161 In the pleadings context, 
the convergence appears to be happening in a vacuum. Neither Bell 
Atlantic v. Twombly nor Ashcroft v. Iqbal mentioned foreign pleading sys-
tems at all.162 Perhaps they should have, and perhaps commentators 
should as well. The foreign models suggest that the new U.S. fact-based 
pleading is not unique but rather enjoys some support among other 
advanced legal systems.163 On the other hand, foreign models may have 
based their decision to impose rigorous pleading standards on other 
features of their procedural system that the United States lacks. The 
point is not that a comparative perspective will necessarily support or 
undermine the convergence but rather will enrich the debate. It may 
also facilitate a deeper understanding of the United States’ own proce-
dural system and norms.164 
 Indeed, this has already occurred in the other area of conver-
gence: the role of the judge. That trend of convergence has tapped in-
to the comparativist inquiry—albeit sometimes with harsh criticism— 
in a way that enlivens and enlightens both understanding and purpose. 
There are obvious differences of opinion, but at least those differences 
of opinion are being aired with the benefit of comparative analysis.165 
This Article suggests that the pleadings trend should learn from the 
judicial role debate and seek out comparativist attitudes as a way to bet-
ter understand where pleading trends are heading and why. 
 Second, these convergences may provide opportunities for plead-
ing reform for U.S. or transnational litigation. A major objection to 
harmonization is a resistance to change. Nonetheless, that objection 
seems less important in recent years, both because the U.S. judge has 
become more comfortable in an active role, and also because Iqbal and 
Twombly have shifted the U.S. pleading system toward foreign pleadings 
systems.166 As noted above, U.S. trends in both areas are forcing the 
change anyway.167 Because these trends are moving toward foreign 
models that enjoy wide international support, foreign procedural norms 
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may be more easily imported into U.S. civil procedure. In addition, 
these convergences may provide support for the ALI/UNIDROIT’s 
proposals for fact pleading and an active judicial role.168 To date, no 
country has adopted the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles, but these conver-
gences may create opportunities for consideration and support of the 
Principles within the United States. 
 Third, these procedural trends may provide an opportunity for the 
United States to change its “go-it-alone” attitude. Perhaps partly as a 
result of United States’ isolationism, many foreign scholars resist U.S.-
style reforms and ridicule U.S. civil procedure.169 A willingness to ac-
cept comparative assessments may allow the United States to join, and 
perhaps even have a respected voice in, the international conversation 
on global procedural norms. In turn, that may provide opportunities 
for the United States to export its procedural norms abroad. This may 
influence a host of reforms in other countries that are converging to-
ward U.S. procedure.170 Some of those convergences in civil law coun-
tries with respect to the role and status of judges converging toward 
U.S. norms have already been discussed, but we believe this opportu-
nity has far broader implications. Asian and Russian systems, for exam-
ple, are experimenting with juries, a feature generally unique to U.S. 
procedure.171 Latin and Scandinavian countries are experimenting 
with aggregate litigation, another quintessentially U.S. phenomenon.172 
The trends we have identified provide the opportunity for the United 
States to make a positive impact on the development of a host of global 
procedural norms, instead of perennially being contrasted with them. 
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B. Comparative Perils 
 In addition to the promises discussed above, there are perils to 
avoid. This Article does not address all possible perils, but a few are 
worthy of mention, if only to express a strong need for caution going 
forward. 
 First, tinkering with just one feature of U.S. procedure may disrupt 
settled features in other aspects of U.S. procedure in unwelcome ways. 
Pleadings and judicial roles are tied to the scope of discovery, for ex-
ample, and it is difficult to have a conversation about these features 
without also having a conversation about discovery. Indeed, failing to 
do so might lead to grave systemic problems.173 But the existence of 
convergence in these areas suggests that broader undercurrents of con-
vergence are happening. Caution is still warranted, and U.S. scholars 
should be fully aware of broader trends, but the interconnectedness of 
civil procedure—long an obstacle to convergence and reform—may 
end up being an ally. 
 Tinkering with pleadings and judicial roles may also erode the 
transubstantivity of the Federal Rules—the foundational assumption 
that the U.S. rules apply regardless of the underlying substantive issues 
at stake174—in unintended ways. For example, Twombly and Iqbal may 
suggest that the rigor of pleading standards should vary depending on 
the type of case.175 Similarly, active case management may be better 
suited for the “big case” or for public litigation, while passive judicial 
oversight is better for the small private case. The foundational assump-
tion of transubstantivity would have to be rethought carefully. 
 Finally, changes in U.S. procedure must be made with full knowl-
edge of the greater systemic repercussions. On the pleadings side, for 
example, if rigorous pleading standards tend to divert vindication of 
private rights outside the civil system, will public enforcement of those 
rights become more robust? What will that mean for the criminal sys-
tem and the administrative state? Assuming foreign jurisdiction is 
proper, will litigants resort to other means by, for example, taking their 
claims abroad, thereby forcing U.S. citizens to defend in foreign courts? 
Will the U.S. system need to provide an alternative process or system 
for vindicating claims that otherwise could not be pleaded?176 
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 Regarding the trend toward active judicial roles, will such closer 
attention reduce the impartiality of the ultimate decisionmaker? In 
counteracting that risk, will trial-level courts rely more heavily on a two-
tiered system of judges, in which magistrates become the “active” case 
managers, while Article III district judges reserve their time for bench 
trials? Will judges push cases toward settlement or arbitration, against 
the parties’ wishes? Will active roles erode the high status of judges in 
the U.S. system? The convergences discussed in this Article may raise 
these questions, and scholars ought to explore what implications they 
hold for system stability and workability. 
Conclusion 
 This Article explores two areas of recent convergence between 
U.S. civil procedure and that of the rest of the world: pleading stan-
dards and the role and status of judges. Recent pleadings changes in 
the United States have moved away from a pure “notice” concept and 
toward a more demanding factual sufficiency standard that is akin to 
what is required in most other countries. The role of judges has experi-
enced convergence in both directions, with U.S. judges becoming more 
“activist” and European judges becoming less so. As for the status of 
judges, several recent events have given more discretion to civil law 
judges and at the same time increased their prestige and visibility, in-
cluding “spillover” effects from international arbitration procedures, 
the post-World War II establishment of constitutional courts and EU 
courts, as well as a phenomenon called “de-codification.” Therefore, 
civil law judges look more like their common law counterparts in terms 
of prestige, visibility, and their role in conducting trials. 
 These observations prompt speculation about what these conver-
gences might herald for the future. This Article finds potential prom-
ises and perils, particularly in the integration and interface with other 
facets of civil litigation. In particular, it proposes cognizance of how the 
recent tightening of U.S. pleading standards will affect discovery, and 
whether civil-law style discovery might hold promise for U.S. proce-
dure. This Article concludes by questioning the continuing vitality of 
trans-substantivity in light of the pleadings changes and the movement 
toward more active case management for “big cases.” Finally, the Article 
questions whether more active case management by judges will under-
cut the historically high degree of prestige of the common law judge, 
which has perhaps been based in part on being “above the fray.” 
 Where these convergences will take civil procedure, both in the 
United States and elsewhere, is unknown. The challenge will be to max-
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imize their promises, both locally and globally, while simultaneously 
minimizing their perils. 
